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I do not like to see social or foreign policy provisions engrafted onto the secu-
rities laws. I have serious doubt, in any event, about the efficacy of using the se-
curities laws to effect social and foreign policy aims, however noble and urgent.1 
INTRODUCTION 
The Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) was founded in 1934 
and bestowed by Congress with a three-pronged mission: (a) protecting inves-
tors; (b) maintaining fair, orderly, and efficient markets; and (c) facilitating 
capital formation.2 Markedly absent from this congressional mandate is any 
administrative authority or charge to effect international, diplomatic, or human 
rights-oriented goals. Instead, the focus of the mandate is the creation and 
preservation of market integrity to assure investors that their investments are 
safe.3 Despite this clear, financial-based mission of the SEC, Congress has co-
opted the agency and its regulatory resources to achieve decidedly non-
financial, extraterritorial goals related to foreign policy. This article addresses 
the use of securities laws and their regulatory agency, the SEC, for congres-
sional foreign policy goals. Part I first examines the historical mission and pur-
pose of federal securities laws and of the SEC. Part I then explores the inherent 
risks of an agency operating outside of its mission, using the economic theory 
of opportunity cost to underscore the importance of an agency acting in con-
formance with its mandate and its institutional expertise. Part I also posits that 
institutional harm is dependent upon the level of authority granted by Congress 
and the tasks inherent in regulating the legislation. Part II analyzes three differ-
ent examples of congressional misappropriation of the resources and expertise 
of the SEC to further congressional extraterritorial interests unrelated to the 
SEC’s core mission. Rather than touting the success of additional corporate so-
cial responsibilities mandated by legislative provisions, this article contributes 
                                                        
1  Daniel M. Gallagher, Comm’r, SEC, Statement at SEC Open Meeting: Proposed Rule to 
Implement Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act—the “Conflict Minerals” Provision (Aug. 
22, 2012), available at http://sec.gov/news/speech/2012/spch082212dmg-minerals.htm. 
2  The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintain Market Integrity, and 
Facilitates Capital Formation, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last visited 
Nov. 11, 2014). 
3  The mandate is met, in theory and practice, by the establishment of a rigorous disclosure 
regime. Thus, market transparency, fairness, and investor protection is achieved through dis-
semination of material information to investors. See, e.g., Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 
224, 230 (1988); see also Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission 
and Corporate Social Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1199–200 (1999). “Only 
through the steady flow of timely, comprehensive, and accurate information can people 
make sound investment decisions.” The Investor’s Advocate, supra note 2. While disclosure 
represents the underpinning of securities laws, this Article does not address the merits of 
disclosure of information relevant to the three statutory examples discussed in Section III, 
infra.  Rather, the focus of this Article is on the institutional design and mandate of the SEC 
as an agency, and the core mission of federal securities laws in general. 
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to this field of literature by arguing that these statutory provisions can do more 
harm than good in the form of wasted opportunity costs. 
I. MAINTAINING THE INTEGRITY OF THE SEC MANDATE 
A. The Role of Securities Laws and the SEC 
It is widely accepted that the primary goal of federal securities laws and 
regulation is investor protection. This is evident from the text of the Securities 
Act of 1933 (“Securities Act”), which includes the phrase “protection of inves-
tors” eight times in its twenty-five pages.4 Likewise, the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”) includes the phrase over two hundred times.5 In 
fact, Senator Duncan Fletcher and Representative Rayburn introduced the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934 “for the protection of investors, for the safe-
guarding of values, and, so far as it may be possible, for the elimination of un-
necessary, unwise, and destructive speculation.”6 Likewise, in the seminal 
securities law case, Basic v. Levinson, the Supreme Court reiterated the purpose 
of the Act: “The 1934 [Exchange] Act was designed to protect investors against 
manipulation of stock prices.”7 In addition to the emphasis on investor protec-
tion, the Exchange Act also created the SEC, which was charged with a tripar-
tite mandate: (a) protecting investors; (b) maintaining fair, orderly, and effi-
cient markets; and (c) facilitating capital formation.8 This mandate has been 
                                                        
4  Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–aa 
(2012)); Michael D. Guttentag, Protection from What? Investor Protection and the JOBS 
Act, 13 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 207, 212 (2013). 
5  Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 78a–pp (2012)). 
6  78 CONG. REC. 2264 (1934) (message from President Franklin D. Roosevelt). 
7  Basic, 485 U.S. at 230 (1988). Interestingly, the “four distinct, but related, harms from 
which securities regulations might be intended to protect investors are: 1) fraud, 2) an un-
level informational playing field, 3) the extraction of private benefits from the firm by firm 
insiders, and 4) investors’ propensity to make unwise investment decisions.” Guttentag, su-
pra note 4, at 207. In other words, investors are to be protected from unfairness, even in the 
form of fraud, but also protected from themselves. Much ink has been spilled analyzing the 
concept of protecting investors from themselves, and whether the threat of an “unsophisti-
cated investor” still looms in today’s market. This concept has been debated fiercely of late, 
particularly with the passage of the JOBS Act and the potential loosening of regulations that 
once only benefited well-known, seasoned issuers. However, while this concept may be the 
focus of my future scholarship, it will not be addressed in depth herein. 
8  The hallmark of the first two prongs of the mandate, investor protection and assurance of 
fair markets, lies in market transparency, and is achieved through disclosure of material in-
formation to investors. See, e.g., Basic, 485 U.S. at 230 (1988); see also Williams, supra 
note 3. In theory, the first prong of the mandate is met if the other two “legs of the stool” fall 
into place. Meaning, once a well-capitalized, fair and efficient market is established, inves-
tors are more likely to invest their capital with a sense of security. Of utmost importance to 
the disclosure regime is the promulgation of material information. Material information in-
cludes “what is important to investors, nothing more and nothing less.” See Donald C. 
Langevoort, Basic at Twenty: Rethinking Fraud on the Market, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 151, 152. 
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reiterated time and again through statutes,9 case law,10 and various academic 
commentaries on securities laws. 
Notably, whenever the clear investor protection mandate of the SEC has 
been altered or slightly broadened, the ultimate goal has been to increase the 
efficiency of the SEC, rather than burden the agency with tasks unrelated to its 
mission. For example, in 1996, Congress passed the National Securities Market 
Improvement Act (“NSMIA”), which included a provision to increase the effi-
ciency of the SEC rulemaking process.11 Although the primary objective of 
                                                                                                                                
Specifically, information is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable 
shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to vote in a corporate election. 
Basic, 485 U.S. at 238 (citing SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 
1968)). The Supreme Court applied the “probability times magnitude test” for estimating 
when speculative or forward-looking information is sufficiently important to rise to the level 
of “material”. The Supreme Court, as well as the SEC through its regulations, has implicitly 
defined material information as information that bears on the economic value of an invest-
ment. See Williams, supra note 3, at 1264. The SEC’s understanding of the materiality 
standard is that a reasonable investor “generally focuses on matters that have affected, or 
will affect, a company’s profitability and financial outlook.” Note, Should the SEC Expand 
Nonfinancial Disclosure Requirements?, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1433, 1434 (2002) (emphasis 
added). 
9  See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-204, tit. III, 116 Stat. 745, 775–85 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (increasing penalties for fraudulent 
corporate activity and requiring certification from executives on public filings, among other 
investor protection initiatives); see also Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Pro-
tection Act, Pub. L. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (containing Title IX, titled “Investor 
Protections and Improvements to the Regulation of Securities,” which provided bounties for 
whistleblowers, increased the budget of the SEC, streamlined the SEC’s operations, expand-
ed secondary liability for aiding and abetting, among other provisions; codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
10  See, e.g., SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953). In Ralston Purina, the Su-
preme Court considered whether securities offered to employees of Ralston Purina constitut-
ed a public offering, such that the offering needed to comply with Section 5 of the Securities 
Act. The Supreme Court reasoned that the offering needed the protection of the Securities 
Act because the employees were unsophisticated investors and likely did not have access to 
all of the relevant information necessary to determine if the securities were a reasonable in-
vestment. In coming to its conclusion, the Supreme Court held that the purpose of the securi-
ties laws “is to protect investors by promoting full disclosure of information thought neces-
sary to informed investment decisions.” Id. at 124. See also Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 
430 U.S. 1 (1977) (holding that the sole purpose of Section 14(e) of the Exchange Act, pro-
hibiting fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative practices in connection with tender offer or 
any solicitation of security holders in opposition to or in favor of tender offer, is protection 
of investors who are confronted with tender offer). 
11  National Securities Market Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, § 106(b), 110 
Stat. 3416, 3424 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 77b). The NSMIA, enacted in response 
to the states’ failure to regulate uniformly certain types of national security offerings, created 
the “covered security” for which state securities registration requirements were preempted 
by federal requirements. Covered securities include securities listed, or approved to be listed, 
on the New York Stock Exchange and NASDAQ; securities sold to qualified purchasers; 
mutual fund shares; securities of the same issuer that are equal in rank or senior to the listed 
securities; certain securities exempt under Section 3(a) of the Securities Act; securities ex-
empt from registration under the Securities Act if sold pursuant to Rule 506 of Regulation D. 
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NSMIA was to provide for federal preemption of state securities regulations in 
various circumstances, the statute included a provision expanding the criteria 
the SEC must use when carrying out rulemakings pursuant to the Securities Act 
or the Exchange Act. Pursuant to the NSMIA, when the SEC engages in rule-
making or review of a rule promulgated by a self-regulatory organization, the 
agency must consider, “in addition to the protection of investors, whether the 
action will promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation.”12 The leg-
islative history on the NSMIA indicates that Congress was intent on continuing 
the SEC’s focus on investor protection in SEC rulemaking, as that had been 
“[f]or 62 years, the foremost mission of the Commission.”13 In recent history, 
Congress has increasingly enlisted the SEC and securities laws for purposes 
well beyond the protection of investors. As described in depth below, congres-
sional expansion of the SEC’s original mandate is problematic for a number of 
reasons, not the least of which is that it undercuts the agency’s efficiency and 
effectiveness, which creates ripple effects of potentially disastrous consequenc-
es. 
B. The Risks Inherent in Inefficient and Inappropriate Use of Securities Laws 
and the SEC 
One may ask what the harm is in the congressional grant of enforcement 
and regulatory authority for statutes in which the goals are outside of an agen-
cy’s mandate. Congress surely has the authority to task agencies with enforcing 
statutes, whether or not the regulatory tasks inherent in enforcing the statute 
aligns with the agency. However, when tasking an agency to work toward a 
goal outside of its mandate and outside of its expertise, the agency and the 
population it is designed to protect are losing out in two ways: (1) by losing the 
opportunity that the proper agency (i.e., one with the particular expertise and 
resources) and its experts would achieve the goal in a more efficient and more 
successful way; and (2) by reducing the ability of the mis-tasked agency to do 
its best with the proper tasks it should be accomplishing.14 In other words, by 
tasking the SEC with an extraneous duty, such as regulation of conflict miner-
                                                                                                                                
Despite federal preemption for registration, the NSMIA allowed states to preserve the right 
to prosecute fraud. Id. at 102(a), 110 Stat. 3417–19 (amending 15 U.S.C. 77r(c)). 
12  Guttentag, supra note 4, at 213 (quoting STEPHEN J. CHOI & A.C. PRITCHARD, SECURITIES 
REGULATION: CASES AND ANALYSIS 575 (3rd ed. 2012)). 
13  H.R. REP. NO. 104-622, at 39 (1996). 
14  See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional 
Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 15 (2010) (urging that independence of agencies is essential for 
creating expertise, avoiding industry capture, ensuring stability, and insulating the agency 
from undue executive control); but see Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in 
Shared Regulatory Space, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1133 (2012) (advocating that interagen-
cy coordination and overlap can result in agency accountability, pooling of expertise and 
competencies, and minimization of costs). 
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als,15 which is premised on an elusive and extraterritorial goal, Congress is 
foregoing the opportunity that another agency, such as the Department of State, 
can design a better solution. Moreover, there is an increased risk that the SEC 
will not have sufficient resources to focus time and efforts toward the goals for 
which it was created; in practicality, this means that the risk of another Enron 
or Madoff scandal increases merely by virtue of overextension of the agency.16 
There is a sliding scale of “harm” imposed upon agencies when assigned with 
new statutory responsibilities and regulations.17 To assess the amount of agen-
cy “harm,” I contend that there are two major considerations: agency goals and 
agency tasks. When agency goals and agency tasks line up with those of new 
congressional legislation assigned to the agency, there is no harm or impact on 
the agency outside of a potential resource drain. When the legislation’s tasks 
fall outside of an agency’s competencies and expertise, and the goals of the leg-
islation also are unrelated to an agency’s goals, the maximum amount of 
“harm” is incurred. The gray area occurs when there are either agency tasks 
that align with the legislation’s requirements, but the goals do not; or the con-
verse situation, wherein the goals of the legislation and the agency align, but 
the tasks involved are not suited to an agency’s expertise and competency. For 
example, in situations where the legislative tasks line up with typical agency 
tasks, but the goals and reasons for the work are outside of the agency’s man-
date, the agency is less likely to appreciate and prioritize the tasks required to 
achieve the extra-agency goals. 
A simpler explanation is afforded by way of analogy. Take the example of 
a car mechanic, who is given an auto shop by a wealthy patron, with strict in-
struction that the auto shop be used to ensure the protection and safety of car 
drivers. If the mechanic is asked by a customer to work on a boat motor, the 
mechanic likely will perform tasks that fall within his area of expertise, and 
perform similar tasks to the ones he would perform if working on a car. None-
theless, working on a boat falls outside of the mechanic’s mandate to protect 
car drivers, and he would be operating outside of the instruction to use the auto 
shop for that reason. If another customer asks the mechanic to edit a draft of 
her novel, the mechanic is in the problematic position of being asked to per-
                                                        
15  See infra Part II.B.1. 
16  See Troy A. Paredes, Comm’r, SEC, Remarks at “The SEC Speaks in 2009” (Feb. 6, 
2009) (transcript available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch020609tap.htm) 
(“[A]s an agency, the SEC has limited resources. Even if the agency’s budget increases, we 
still will be faced with the challenge of allocating a finite number of people and funds. It is 
critical to recognize that there is an opportunity cost when we dedicate resources to adminis-
ter particular regulations, undertake certain examinations and inspections, and pursue specif-
ic enforcement actions.”); see also Tom C.W. Lin, A Behavioral Framework for Securities 
Risk, 34 SEA. U. L. REV. 325 (2011) (discussing the examination and improvement of the 
efficacy of the current securities risk-disclosure framework). 
17  For these purposes, I define “harm” as the disconnect between the goals and tasks re-
quired to enforce a statute, and the goals, expertise, and resources afforded to the agency 
tasked with implementing the regulation. 
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form a task for which he does not have expertise, in addition to the task being 
outside of the mandate defining the purpose of his auto shop. 
In this analogy, of course, the SEC is the mechanic and the “wealthy pa-
tron” is Congress. To be a perfect analogy, however, the “customer” would be 
the same person as the wealthy patron who gave the auto shop to the mechanic 
in the first place. In other words, Congress established the SEC and granted the 
agency its authority; and yet it is Congress that is impressing on the agency to 
work outside of its stated mandate. Congress certainly has the authority to re-
quire the agency to enforce its statutes. Yet the imposition of additional regula-
tory tasks outside of the expertise and mandate of the agency is dangerous be-
cause of the risk of wasted opportunity costs, and the disregard for institutional 
design. 
At a structural level, the importance of institutional design cannot be over-
looked when assessing agency tasks and goals. Proper institutional design, and 
adherence to the design, can result in avoidance of poor decision-making aris-
ing from a lack of expertise. There is a reason that Congress established the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission, as outlined in Part I.A. Quite simply, the 
SEC is tasked primarily with protecting investors, in addition to ensuring a fair 
and efficient market, and facilitating capital formation. Ignoring the clarion 
task of investor protection, or at least amending that clarion agenda to include 
tasks related to foreign policy, only serves to dilute the importance of the agen-
cy’s original mandate.18 
Much has been written regarding theories that describe the administrative 
state, and the ramifications of agencies expanding beyond their original and in-
tended scope;19 however, the predominant theories related to the administrative 
state, such as public choice,20 neopluralism,21 and public interest theory,22 are 
                                                        
18  See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 
421, 478 (1987). Sunstein outlines the congressional goals for agency creation during the 
New Deal, noting that in the establishment of the new agencies, Congress had minimal 
guidelines regarding agency discretion. Id. Instead, Congress wanted agencies to ensure 
against “unreasonable practices” and to prevent “unfairness.” Id. Moreover, Sunstein points 
out that the New Deal agency creation underscored the importance of insulated and technical 
expert agencies, which was meant to distribute powers and functions of the national gov-
ernment. Id. at 441. See also Lisa Schultz Bressman & Robert B. Thompson, The Future of 
Agency Independence, 63 VAND. L. REV. 599, 612 (2010) (“Independence was traditionally 
justified, particularly during the New Deal era, as promoting expertise.”). 
19  See, e.g., Amitai Aviram, Allocating Regulatory Resources, 37 J. CORP. L. 739 (2012); 
Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Minimalism and Experimentalism in the Administra-
tive State, 100 GEO. L.J. 53 (2011). 
20  Public choice theory posits that government officials are motivated by self-interest and 
work to advance their own interests, as well as the interests of well-organized political inter-
est groups, often at the expense of the general public. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, The 
SEC as a Bureaucracy: Public Choice, Institutional Rhetoric, and the Process of Policy 
Formation, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 527, 529 (1990). 
21  See Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative Process, 
98 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 57 (1998). Neopluralist theory considers central the group interest but 
 
15 NEV. L.J. 297 - WOODY.DOCX 3/4/2015  2:55 PM 
304 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 15:297 
not directly applicable here.23 Consider, instead, the economic theory of oppor-
tunity cost to the agency and investors as a population. The theory of oppor-
tunity cost holds that there is a cost associated with opting to perform certain 
tasks at the expense of others.24 The SEC has a finite amount of resources. 
Therefore, calculated choices must be made regarding what resources are ex-
pended on an ever-increasing number of tasks. Congress continues to burden 
the agency with additional regulations, requiring rulemakings and enforcement, 
but without adjusting the agency’s budget commensurately. Commissioner 
Troy Paredes made the argument for factoring opportunity cost into the calcu-
lation of what tasks the agency undertakes: 
When deciding how best to allocate the agency’s resources, the Commission has 
to make difficult choices. . . . As much as we might like to, we simply cannot 
pursue to the fullest extent each and every possible violation of the securities 
laws. We have to make tradeoffs—reflective of our policy determinations—in 
light of the relevant costs and benefits that attend our different options. One cost 
that must be accounted for is the opportunity cost of the time and effort we 
spend on a particular matter. Even when we pursue a meritorious case, there is 
an opportunity cost that may argue for allocating the Commission’s resources 
differently. Resources committed to a particular matter become unavailable for 
some other—perhaps better—purpose. Put simply, if we commit resources to 
aggressively pursue case A our ability to pursue case B may be compromised. 
The concern is that it may have been better for investors and our markets had we 
focused on case B instead of case A.25 
                                                                                                                                
“assumes that organized interest groups compete with one another . . . to obtain state-
provided goods, including favorable regulation.” Id. 
22  Id. Public interest theory elevates the importance of public monitoring of regulators, and 
argues that such oversight leads to outcomes reflecting the general interest. 
23  Interestingly, the relatively novel theory of civic republican theory is slightly more appli-
cable: 
The theory attributes two related behavioral characteristics to such participants. First, be-
cause the theory contemplates that interested parties’ preferences are endogenous to the regula-
tory decisionmaking process itself, it imagines that participants approach regulatory deci-
sionmaking open-mindedly, without uncompromising commitments to any particular outcome. 
Indeed, this postulate most distinguishes the civic republican theory from its rivals: The theory 
holds that the preferences of those participating in regulatory decisionmaking processes ulti-
mately crystallize during the very course of the decisionmaking process. 
Second, the theory contemplates that those participants exhibit a certain amount of public-
spiritedness. That is, parties seek to advance not only their own self-regarding interests, but also 
the broader interests of the entire political community. 
Id. at 77–78 (footnotes omitted). Because the common factors among the three statutory ex-
amples analyzed in this piece are the extraterritorial, diplomatic, and humanitarian goals as-
sociated with each statute, the civic republican theory is slightly more applicable because the 
true benefactors of the legislation are not the legislators or government officials themselves, 
nor is it an industry. 
24  “The opportunity cost of some decision is the value of the next best alternative that must 
be given up because of that decision.” WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & ALAN S. BLINDER, 
MICROECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES AND POLICY 4 (11th ed. 2009). 
25  Troy A. Paredes, Comm’r, SEC, Remarks at the 43rd Annual Rocky Mountain Securities 
Conference (May 6, 2011) (transcript available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011 
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In the legislative provisions detailed in Part II, the costs of regulating and 
enforcing the provisions greatly outweigh the benefit. More to the point, the 
benefit of the legislative provisions is nebulous at best, and all three expect that 
the benefits will be felt abroad.26 Thus, the opportunity costs associated with 
pursuing nebulous and extraterritorial goals result in the agency being unable to 
focus on tasks appropriate to the agency’s expertise and mandate. 
II. CONGRESSIONAL USE OF SECURITIES LAWS FOR FOREIGN POLICY 
PURPOSES 
Despite the clear-cut mission of the SEC and the general aim of federal se-
curities laws to protect investors, Congress has repeatedly used securities laws 
and the SEC’s regulatory resources to further its foreign policy goals. In this 
Part, I examine three examples of stretching securities laws and the mission of 
the SEC to promote congressional extraterritorial goals. Each of these exam-
ples represents an amendment to Section 13 of the Exchange Act. Although 
one of these examples is the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, passed in 1977, the 
other two examples are found in the more recent Dodd-Frank Wall Street Re-
form and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (“Dodd-Frank”). Although not ad-
dressed herein, Congress has amended Section 13 since Dodd-Frank with yet 
another extraterritorially-aimed provision, the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria 
Human Rights Act of 2012.27 This trend signals that Congress is increasingly 
turning to securities laws and the SEC as tools in its foreign policy arsenal. 
                                                                                                                                
/spch050611tap.htm). Paredes indicated that there were “guideposts” the agency must follow 
in determining how to allocate resources and accomplish myriad agency tasks. Those guide-
posts include the following considerations: (1) considering how and to what extent did the 
misconduct harm investors; (2) whether the misconduct was intentional or the result of neg-
ligence; (3) whether certain enforcement-related objectives have already been satisfied; (4) 
whether the wrongdoer will be meaningfully sanctioned through means other than SEC ac-
tion; (5) the deterrent effect of bringing a certain type of case; (6) whether the agency can 
achieve the relief it seeks without charging every potential violation and bringing a more 
streamlined case. Id. 
26  Not discussed herein, but I hope to address in future scholarship, is the fact that each of 
the provisions analyzed in Section III represent the exportation of American business mor-
als. In other words, the purpose of the three provisions analyzed in this paper is not to shine 
sunlight on American businesses and their practices, but instead to regulate foreign activity 
that touches on American business. Of course, this is a large topic that warrants its own arti-
cle. 
27  Although not examined in this Article, I plan on addressing in future scholarship the most 
recent amendment to Section 13, the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 
2012. Section 219 of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act amends Section 
13 of the Exchange Act, codified at Section 13(r). Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human 
Rights Act, Pub. L. 112-158, § 219(a), 126 Stat. 1214, 1235–36 (2012) (codified at 15 
U.S.C. § 78m(r) (2012)). This provision requires an issuer that files Exchange Act periodic 
reports to provide disclosure in its periodic report if during the reporting period it or any of 
its affiliates has knowingly engaged in certain specified activities involving contacts with or 
support for Iran or other identified persons involved in terrorism or the creation of weapons 
of mass destruction. Id. at 1235. Section 13(r) also requires an issuer that includes a descrip-
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These three examples represent various levels of inappropriate authority 
placed on the SEC by Congress. Each statute discussed has extraterritorial 
goals at the heart of the legislation, as detailed in the legislative histories.28 In 
examining the three examples, it is true that when the means of achieving the 
extraterritorial goal lines up with the expertise and purpose of the SEC, then the 
result is a beneficial use of agency expertise for an extra-agency purpose; how-
ever, as further explored in Part II, Congress should be wary of placing the 
burden of lofty foreign policy goals on the backs of agencies that are already 
stretched thin, and for which foreign policy is not a domain. 
A. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act29 
1. Statutory Requirements 
In 1977, Congress passed the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”),30 
aimed at eradicating bribery occurring overseas for the purpose of obtaining 
business. Specifically, the FCPA prohibits the corrupt use of the mail or any 
other instrumentality of interstate commerce in furtherance of any offer, pay-
ment, promise to pay, or authorization of the payment of money or any other 
thing of value to any person, knowing that all or some of the payment will be 
offered, given, or promised, directly or indirectly, to a foreign official to influ-
ence or induce the foreign official to either commit an act in violation of his or 
her lawful duty, or to secure an improper advantage in obtaining or retaining 
                                                                                                                                
tion of an identified activity in a periodic report to concurrently file with the Commission a 
notice that identifies the issuer and indicates that disclosure of the activity has been included 
in its periodic report. Id. at 1236. While this amendment also seems to be congressional 
overreaching in terms of the role of securities laws, it is not examined in depth here. 
28  The stated purpose of each of the statutes discussed includes achieving a result in a for-
eign country. This is distinct from the statutes being applied extraterritorially, although in 
the case of each of these statutes, there is an enacted or proposed piece of legislation in Eu-
rope mirroring the American laws. See, e.g., Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the 
European Parliament and of the Council Setting Up a Union System for Supply Chain Due 
Diligence Self-Certification of Responsible Importers of Tin, Tantalum and Tungsten, Their 
Ores, and Gold Originating in Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas, COM (2014) 111 fi-
nal (Mar. 5, 2014); Bribery Act, 2010, c. 23 (U.K.). 
29  Unlike the other two statutory examples discussed in this section, the FCPA does not re-
quire an affirmative filing on behalf of issuing corporations. Instead, the FCPA is a statute 
prohibiting specific corporate behavior, rather than mandating it. This is worth noting be-
cause it means that the division tasked with regulating the FCPA is the Division of Enforce-
ment of the SEC; whereas with the filing requirements of Section 1502 and Section 1504 of 
Dodd-Frank, the Division of Corporate Finance reviews the proactive corporate filings. As a 
general matter, the fact that different divisions of the SEC are tasked with handling these 
regulations does not diminish the fact that the SEC is operating outside of its mandate in en-
forcing parts or all of each of these statutes. 
30 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977) (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
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business.31 In addition to the anti-bribery provision, the FCPA also includes ac-
counting provisions that require corporations to make and keep books and rec-
ords that accurately and fairly reflect the transactions of the corporation and to 
devise and maintain an adequate system of internal accounting methods.32 Both 
the anti-bribery and the accounting provisions are jointly enforced by the De-
partment of Justice (“DOJ”) and the SEC. 
In particular, the FCPA prohibits bribes in the conduct of business, which 
includes “payments made to secure favorable tax treatment, to reduce or elimi-
nate customs duties, to obtain government action to prevent competitors from 
entering a market, or to circumvent a licensing or permit requirement.”33 In re-
cent guidance promulgated by the DOJ and SEC in November 2012, the gov-
ernment agencies interpret the FCPA to cover payments that are business-
related, although not necessarily made with the intention of obtaining or retain-
ing business or gaining an unfair advantage in that regard. This interpretation is 
buttressed by examples cited by the government, including (1) 
“[c]ircumventing the rules for importation of products,” (2) “[g]aining access 
to non-public bid tender information,” (3) “[i]nfluencing the adjudication of 
lawsuits or enforcement actions,” and (4) “[o]btaining exceptions to regula-
tions.”34 
2. Legislative History of the FCPA 
The impetus for this legislation was that in the wake of the Watergate 
scandal, the SEC set out to investigate questionable corporate payments that 
were often disguised on the corporate books and records.35 As a result of its ex-
tensive “questionable payment” investigation, the SEC discovered over four 
hundred companies that had made questionable payments, totaling over $300 
                                                        
31  Id. at § 103(a), 91 Stat. 1495. 
32  Id. at § 102, 98 Stat. 1494. 
33  CRIMINAL DIV., U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE & ENFORCEMENT DIV., SEC, A RESOURCE GUIDE 
TO THE U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 13 (2012), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/fcpa/fcpa-resource-guide.pdf. 
34  Id. This is a somewhat broader interpretation of the Congressional intent set out in the 
1988 legislative history. Although Congress cited its intent to cover payments to obtain 
“more favorable tax treatment,” it also cautioned against expanding the prohibition to lobby-
ing and other “normal representations to government officials.” Id. at 107 n.67. 
35  See, e.g., Stanley Sporkin, The Worldwide Banning of Schmiergeld: A Look at the For-
eign Corrupt Practices Act on Its Twentieth Birthday, 18 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 269, 271–72 
(1998) (explaining that, as he watched the Watergate scandal unfold on television, Sporkin 
wondered how the corporations involved put the illegal payments on their books and rec-
ords, and as an investigator and later as Director of Enforcement for the SEC, he set out to 
investigate the breadth of potentially illegal corporate payments); see also Mike Koehler, 
The Story of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 929, 954 (2012). 
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million to foreign officials.36 Notably, the SEC was chiefly concerned with the 
accuracy of the corporate books and records, rather than the fact that the pay-
ments went to foreign officials.37 
In its summary of the investigation, the SEC proposed legislation aimed at 
shoring up corporate accountability, but declined to address the issue of foreign 
corruption. Specifically, the SEC suggested that Congress pass legislation that 
would (1) prohibit the falsification of corporate books and records, (2) prohibit 
corporate executives and agents from making false or misleading statements to 
auditors, and (3) mandate that corporate management establish and maintain 
adequate accounting controls such that corporate transactions are properly rec-
orded.38 The SEC Report, however, made clear that the agency took no position 
on the prohibition of certain kinds of foreign payments because such a question 
“presents a broad issue of national policy with important implications for inter-
national trade and commerce, the appropriateness of application of United 
States law to transactions by United States citizens in foreign countries, and the 
possible impact of such legislation upon the foreign relations of the United 
States.”39 
The SEC Chairman at the time the FCPA was proposed, Roderick Hills, 
submitted written testimony to the Senate Banking Committee and emphasized 
that the SEC did not want to have a role in the civil enforcement of the anti-
bribery provisions because “they embody separate and distinct policies from 
those underlying the federal securities laws.”40 He added that SEC enforcement 
of the anti-bribery provisions did “not easily fit” within the SEC’s mandate. 
Because the SEC saw its role as mandating corporate disclosure rather than 
“impos[ing] substantive regulation on a particular aspect of corporate behav-
ior,” Hills stated that agency did not “seek nor entirely wish to have the respon-
sibility for stopping these kinds of payments,” meaning payments to foreign 
public officials.41 
 In spite of the SEC’s efforts to narrow its jurisdictional authority with re-
spect to the FCPA, Congress awarded the agency enforcement powers over the 
                                                        
36  See Daniel Patrick Ashe, Comment, The Lengthening Anti-Bribery Lasso of the United 
States: The Recent Extraterritorial Application of the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 
73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2897, 2902–03 (2005). 
37  S. BANKING, HOUS. & URBAN AFFAIRS COMM., 94TH CONG., REPORT OF THE SECURITIES 
AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION ON QUESTIONABLE AND ILLEGAL CORPORATE PAYMENTS AND 
PRACTICES (Comm. Print 1976), reprinted in SEC. REG. & L. REP., NO. 353, at 2 (stating “the 
primary thrust of our actions has been to restore the efficacy of the system of corporate ac-
countability”). 
38  Id. at 11. 
39  Id. at 13. 
40  Barbara Black, The SEC and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Fighting Global Cor-
ruption Is Not Part of the SEC’s Mission, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 1093, 1098 (2012). 
41  Id. at 1098–99 & n.22 (quoting Foreign Corrupt Practices and Domestic and Foreign 
Investment Disclosure: Hearing on S. 305 Before the Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban 
Affairs, 95th Cong. 111, 124–25 (1977) (statement of Roderick Hills, Chairman, SEC)). 
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books and records and internal controls provisions of the FCPA (the “account-
ing provisions”), as well as the anti-bribery provisions.42 The Senate Report 
outlining the jurisdictional overlap between the DOJ and the SEC explained 
that the SEC had developed expertise in foreign investigations, and that the 
joint investigative responsibilities would reduce duplication of efforts and 
strengthen enforcement abilities.43 
Interestingly, in 1981 and again in 1983, the Senate Banking Committee 
held hearings to consider amending the FCPA to consolidate enforcement of 
the anti-bribery provision in the DOJ.44 In both instances, the SEC did not op-
pose consolidation and emphasized that the SEC’s primary interest is in disclo-
sure to investors rather than substantive regulation of commercial transaction. 
The Senate Banking Committee recommended consolidation after both the 
1981 and 1983 hearings. Nevertheless, Congress declined to take action to con-
solidate the anti-bribery enforcement in the DOJ, which would have left the 
SEC with only enforcement power over the accounting provisions. 
3. Anti-Bribery Enforcement Is Outside of the SEC Mandate and 
Represents an Increase in the Agency’s Opportunity Cost 
At its inception, the FCPA broke new ground in the fight against global 
corruption.45 The genesis of the FCPA is understandable given that it was 
passed in the wake of the Watergate scandal.46 Indeed, sweeping legislation is a 
common occurrence after major scandals or crises; for example, Sarbanes-
Oxley was passed in the wake of the Enron and WorldCom scandals, and 
Dodd-Frank was passed in reaction to the financial crisis of 2008. This does not 
diminish, however, the problematic jurisdictional authority granted to the SEC 
for FCPA enforcement. Even the agency’s representatives at the time of the 
passage of the legislation did not want enforcement authority over the anti-
bribery provisions of the FCPA. Yet thirty-six years after its passage, the juris-
diction for both the anti-bribery and accounting provisions still rests concur-
rently with the SEC and DOJ, despite multiple attempts to consolidate the anti-
bribery provision enforcement under the agency better equipped to handle it.47 
Arguably, if bribes are properly recorded on corporate books and records, 
regulation of them is not related to investor protection, and therefore outside of 
                                                        
42  H.R. REP. NO. 100-576 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1547. 
43  S. REP. NO. 95-114, at 12 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4098, 4109. 
44  Black, supra note 40, at 1105–07. 
45  But see Joe Palazzolo, From Watergate to Today, How FCPA Became So Feared, WALL 
ST. J., Oct. 2, 2012, at B1 (pointing out that the FCPA was plucked out of “relative obscuri-
ty” since 2000, before which it was a rarely used statute). 
46  The post-Watergate era also ushered in other reforms, such as campaign finance laws. 
See, e.g., FED. ELECTION COMM’N, THE FEC AND THE FEDERAL CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW 1 
(2014), available at http://www.fec.gov/pages/brochures/fec_feca_brochure.pdf. 
47  See Black, supra note 40, at 1107.  
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the SEC’s core mission. One could go so far as to argue that if payment of a 
bribe helps a corporation, investors may not have any issue with the practice 
(from a financial standpoint, rather than a moral one). In fact, SEC Commis-
sioner Philip Loomis stated in a House of Representatives hearing that “the 
mere fact that a foreign payment has been made, particularly in a relatively 
small amount, is not necessarily a material fact to investors”; he noted that that 
there is a “significant question as to the extent to which information about for-
eign payments, even if illegal under foreign law or our law, or regarded as be-
ing improper, is material to an investor in appraising investment in a very large 
corporation.”48 
The Senate Report sparking the FCPA did not state explicitly that bribery 
was an investor protection issue. Instead, the Report explains that foreign poli-
cy was the primary reason for the passage of the FCPA.49 In addition to foreign 
policy concerns, congressional members expressed the need for better business 
ethics, and a sense of morality in foreign corporate transactions.50 There was 
also a sense among legislators that the United States should be a global leader 
in prohibiting corruption.51 Investor protection was not, and is not, a goal of the 
FCPA. At most, there was a nod toward indirect investor protection in an insti-
tutional sense in the Senate Report: “There is a broad consensus that the pay-
ment of bribes to influence business decisions corrodes the free-enterprise sys-
tem. Bribery short-circuits the marketplace. Where bribes are paid, business is 
directed not to the most efficient producer, but to the most corrupt. This misal-
locates resources and reduces economic efficiency.”52 However, the SEC has 
expertise in regulating corporate books and records. This is the task that affords 
it the capability of meeting its mandate of investor protection. The agency 
should not be tasked with the additional foreign policy aim of reducing global 
corruption when jurisdiction is equally and, indeed, more appropriately granted 
to the DOJ. The result of this additional regulatory task is an increase in the 
agency’s opportunity cost, which stretches the agency’s resources and human 
                                                        
48  MIKE KOEHLER, THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT IN A NEW ERA 11–12 (2014). 
49    Bribery of foreign officials by U.S. corporations . . . creates severe foreign policy problems. 
The revelations of improper payments invariably tends to embarrass friendly regimes and lowers 
the esteem for the United States among the foreign public. It lends credence to the worse suspi-
cions sown by extreme nationalists or Marxists that American businesses operating in their 
country have a corrupting influence on their political systems. It increases the likelihood that 
when an angry citizenry demands reform, the target will be not only the corrupt local officials, 
but also the United States and U.S. owned business. 
  Bribery by U.S. companies also undermines the foreign policy objective of the United States 
to promote democratically accountable governments and professionalized civil services in de-
veloping countries. 
Koehler, supra note 35, at 942–43 (quoting S. REP. NO. 94-1031, at 3–4 (1976)). 
50  Id. at 947. 
51  Id. 
52  Id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 94-1031, at 3). 
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capital. The agency is therefore less equipped to handle its properly assigned 
tasks, and therefore is inflicted with institutional harm. 
B. Conflict Minerals Disclosure Requirements 
1. Statutory Requirements 
Section 1502 of Dodd-Frank amends Section 13 of the Exchange Act53 by 
increasing mandatory disclosure requirements for producers of goods that in-
clude minerals derived from the Democratic Republic of Congo (“DRC”).54 In 
general, this provision mandates the annual disclosure of whether conflict min-
erals necessary in the production of a company’s manufactured goods originate 
in the DRC or an adjoining country.55 The term “conflict mineral” is defined to 
mean “(A) columbite-tantalite (coltan) [also known as tantalum], cassiterite [al-
so known as tin ore], gold, wolframite [also known as tungsten], or their de-
rivatives; or (B) any other mineral or its derivatives determined by the Secre-
tary of State to be financing conflict in the [DRC] or an adjoining country.”56 If 
the conflict minerals in use originated in the DRC or an adjoining country, the 
disclosing party must submit a report to the SEC that includes: (i) a description 
of the due diligence process undertaken by the disclosing party with regard to 
the source and chain of custody of those conflict minerals, which must be inde-
pendently audited;57 and (ii) a description of the products manufactured or con-
tracted to be manufactured that are not “DRC conflict free,” the identity of the 
independent auditor of the source and supply chain, the facilities that process 
the conflict minerals used by the disclosing party, the country from which the 
conflict minerals were obtained, and the efforts used to determine the origin 
(i.e., the specific mine) of the conflict mineral.58 For a product to be considered 
                                                        
53  15 U.S.C. § 78m(p) (2012). 
54  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 111-203, 
§ 1502(b), 124 Stat. 1376, 2213–15 (2010) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78m). The 
regulation on conflict minerals is quite different from conflict diamonds, which is regulated 
by the Clean Diamond Trade Act, by virtue of the United States being a signatory to the 
Kimberly Process Certification Scheme. 
55  15 U.S.C. § 78m(p)(1)(A). “Adjoining countries” include Angola, Burundi, Central Afri-
can Republic, Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zam-
bia. 
56  Dodd-Frank Act, § 1502(e)(4)(A)-(B), 124 Stat. 2218. 
57  15 U.S.C. § 78m(p)(1)(A)(i). This independent audit must be certified by the disclosing 
party, which is an integral part of the due diligence process. 15 U.S.C. at § 78m(p)(1)(B). 
Additionally, this audit must be considered reliable by the SEC. See 15 U.S.C. at 
§ 78m(p)(1)(C). 
58  Id. at § 78m(p)(1)(A)(i)–(ii). However, on April 14, 2014, the District Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia Circuit held that requiring issuers to describe their products as 
“not DRC conflict free” is compelled speech and therefore a violation of freedom of speech 
under the First Amendment. Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 748 F.3d 359, 373 (D.C. Cir. 
2014). The Court held that requiring an issuer to label its products as “not DRC conflict 
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“DRC conflict free,” the product must not contain minerals that finance, direct-
ly or indirectly, any armed groups in the DRC or adjoining countries.59 
The reach of this disclosure requirement extends to any individual or com-
pany subject to any of the Exchange Act’s disclosure requirements if such 
companies or individuals require conflict minerals in the production of the 
products they manufacture or contract to be manufactured.60 Beyond making 
the relevant disclosures to the SEC, those subject to this provision must post 
the required disclosures on their corporate websites.61 
The SEC’s rule sets out three steps issuers should follow in order to com-
ply with requirements of Section 1502. First, issuers62 must determine whether 
Section 1502 applies to them. According to the rule, issuers that both directly 
manufacture products using conflict minerals, as well as those that contract for 
the manufacturing of their products, are subject to the rule.63 The final rule 
                                                                                                                                
free” is tantamount to requiring an issuer to “confess blood on its hands.” Id. at 371. The 
D.C. Circuit dismissed all other challenges to the rule, including to the lack of any de mini-
mis exception in the SEC’s rule and to the SEC’s cost-benefit analysis. Id. at 366, 369. Thus, 
the remainder of the rule is intact, but companies are not required to use the mandated term 
“DRC conflict free” in their descriptions of products. 
59  15 U.S.C. § 78m(p)(1)(D). 
60  Id. at § 78m(p)(2)(A)–(B). 
61  Id. at § 78m(p)(1)(E). 
62  Under Rule 13p-1: 
[E]very registrant that files reports with the Commission under Sections 13(a) or 15(d) of the 
Exchange Act, having conflict minerals that are necessary to the functionality or production of a 
product manufactured or contracted by that registrant to be manufactured, shall file a report on 
Form SD within the period specified in that Form disclosing the information required by the ap-
plicable items of Form SD as specified in that Form. 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act Frequently Asked Questions: 
Conflict Minerals, SEC (May 30, 2013), http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance 
/conflictminerals-faq.htm (citations omitted). This rule, therefore, applies to every issuer re-
quired to file reports under either 13(a) or 15(d), including voluntary filers. Id. However, an 
issuer that acquires, or otherwise obtains control of, a non-reporting company that manufac-
tures or contracts to manufacture products containing conflict minerals, must file a report 
regarding the acquired company’s products at least starting the first calendar year that begins 
no sooner than eight months after the effective date of the acquisition. Id. The FAQ notes 
that the SEC staff “will not object if the issuer starts reporting for the first reporting calendar 
year that begins no sooner than eight months after the effective date of its initial public offer-
ing registration statement.” Id. Effectively, a company that acquires a manufacturer that pre-
viously was not subject to the rules need not gather information on the acquired company’s 
products until the next calendar year if the closing of the acquisition occurred on or after 
May 1. Furthermore, an issuer must file a disclosure on its behalf as well as regarding the 
subsidiaries included in its consolidated financials. Id. 
63  Mining activities are excluded specifically from the rule because they are not viewed as 
falling within the definition of “manufacturing.” This exclusion includes the mining of lower 
grade gold ore, as well as the ancillary activities of mining, such as transporting the ore to a 
processing facility, crushing and milling the ore, mixing crushed or milled ore with cyanide 
solution, floating cyanide mixture through a leaching circuit, extracting gold from a leached 
circuit, smelting the gold into ingots or bars and transporting the ingots or bars to a refinery 
for refining. Id. 
15 NEV. L.J. 297 - WOODY.DOCX 3/4/2015  2:55 PM 
Fall 2014] SECURITIES LAWS AS FOREIGN POLICY 313 
states that a company is considered to be “contracting to manufacture” a prod-
uct if it has influence over the manufacturing of that product. The rule clarifies 
that a company is NOT deemed to have influence over the manufacturing of a 
product if it: (1) merely affixes its brand or logo to a generic product manufac-
tured by a third party;64 (2) services, maintains, or repairs a product manufac-
tured by a third party;65 or (3) specifies or negotiates contractual terms with a 
manufacturer that do not directly relate to the manufacturing of the product.66 
In assessing whether it is subject to the conflict minerals disclosure rules, 
an issuer must determine if the conflict minerals are “necessary to the function-
ality or production of a product.”67 The SEC did not define what “necessary to 
the functionality or production of a product” means. However, the two Con-
gressional sponsors of Section 1502 opined in a comment letter that the provi-
sion should cover “all uses of conflict minerals coming from the DRC—except 
those that are ‘naturally occurring’ or ‘unintentionally included’ in the prod-
uct.”68 Notably, the final rule did not carve out an exception for the de minimis 
presence of conflict minerals in products. Instead, all products with any amount 
of conflict minerals “necessary to the functionality or the production of the 
product” are subject to the regulation. 
                                                        
64  If an issuer’s logo, serial number or other identifier is etched into a generic product that is 
manufactured by a third party, the issuer will not be deemed to have contracted to manufac-
ture the product. Id. 
65  An issuer is not required to report on conflict minerals contained in equipment that it 
manufactures or contracts to manufacture to the extent that the equipment is used for a ser-
vice provided by the issuer and that: (a) the equipment is retained by the service provider; 
(b) is to be returned to the service provider; or (c) is intended to be abandoned by the cus-
tomer following the terms of service. Id. Item 1.01(a) of Form SD requires issuers only to 
report on conflict minerals that are necessary to the functionality or production of “products” 
they manufacture or contract to have manufactured, and the staff does not interpret equip-
ment used to provide services to be “products” under the rule. Id. Further, the sale of used 
tools, machines, or other equipment that an issuer manufactured or contracted to manufac-
ture for use in the manufacture of its products does not fall under the Rule. The SEC staff 
does not view these items as products of the issuer, and their subsequent entry into the 
stream of commerce does not transform them into products of the issuer. Id. 
66  For purposes of the rule, the SEC will not distinguish between the components of a prod-
uct that an issuer directly manufactures or contracts to manufacture and the generic pur-
chased components included in the product. Thus, companies whose products contain gener-
ic components not manufactured by the company must conduct appropriate due diligence to 
ascertain the source of the minerals in the generic components included in their products. 
Packaging, however, is not considered part of the “product,” even if the packaging or con-
tainer is necessary to preserve the usability of the product up to, and following, the product’s 
purchase. This clarification is particularly important to companies in the food, beverage, and 
pharmaceutical industries where the packaging could contain conflict minerals, but the actu-
al products do not. Although such companies need not comply with the rule, companies that 
manufacture the packaging and containers must do so. Id. 
67  15 U.S.C. § 78m(p)(2)(B) (2012). 
68  Conflict Minerals, Release No. 34-63547, 75 Fed. Reg. 80,948, 80,953 (proposed Dec. 
23, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229 & 249) (quoting a letter from Sen. Richard J. 
Durbin and Rep. Jim McDermott, U.S. Congress). 
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Once an issuer has determined that its products contain minerals listed in 
Section 1502, it must determine if these minerals are truly conflict minerals, as 
defined by the statute, and conduct an inquiry into the origin of the contents of 
their products.69 The SEC stated in its rule that, in determining the origin or the 
minerals, the regulation requires a “reasonable country of origin inquiry,” exe-
cuted in good faith.70 However, the SEC did not set forth guidelines as to what 
constitutes a reasonable country of origin inquiry. Rather, it noted that it would 
consider an issuer to have satisfied the inquiry requirement it if sought and re-
ceived reasonably reliable representations from the facility at which its miner-
als were processed that those minerals did not originate from the DRC or a 
neighboring country. 
If, after completing a reasonable country of origin inquiry, the company 
knows or has no reason to believe that the minerals did not originate in any of 
the listed countries, or are from scrap or recycled sources, the company must 
provide a brief description of the basis for its determination on newly-created 
Form SD, which will be required to be filed with the Commission. The issuer 
must post that description on its website and disclose the website address to the 
Commission on Form SD. On the other hand, if a company knows or has rea-
son to believe that the minerals may have originated in one of the listed coun-
tries, or may not be from scrap or recycled sources, the company must perform 
due diligence on the source and chain of supply of its minerals and submit a 
Conflict Minerals Report (“CMR”) as an exhibit to Form SD. The CMR must 
also be posted on the company website.71 
                                                        
69  Id. at 80,954. 
70  Id. 
71  Conflict Minerals, Release No. 34-67716, 77 Fed. Reg. 56,274, 56,302 (Sep. 12, 2012) 
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240 & 249b). The CMR itself must include proof that the 
company conducted due diligence on the source and chain of supply of the conflict minerals. 
The due diligence must meet a standard that is nationally or internationally recognized, such 
as the due diligence guidance approved by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD). Id. at 56,326. 
A company’s products can still be labeled “DRC conflict free” if the minerals originate 
from one of the listed countries but did not finance or benefit armed groups. Id. at 56,324. If 
a company determines, after conducting due diligence, that its products are “DRC conflict 
free,” it must certify its findings by: (1) obtaining an independent private sector audit of its 
CMR; (2) certify that it obtained the audit; (3) identify the auditor; and (4) append a copy of 
the audit report as part of the CMR. If a company cannot assert that its products are “DRC 
conflict free,” then, in addition to the audit and certification requirements listed above, the 
company must state in its CMR: (1) that the products manufactured or contracted to be man-
ufactured have not been found to be “DRC conflict free”; (2) the facilities used to process 
the conflict minerals; (3) the country of origin of the conflict minerals; (4) the efforts to de-
termine the mine or location of origin with the “greatest possible specificity.” Id. at 56,333. 
Finally, if a company is unable to determine if its products are “DRC conflict free” be-
cause it cannot determine the country of origin, or if cannot determine if the minerals in its 
products financed or benefited armed groups, it will be subject to a temporary two-year tran-
sition period during which time its products will be labeled “DRC conflict undeterminable.” 
The company must still file a CMR, stating: (1) the facilities used to process the conflict 
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The fulsome supply chain due diligence, along with the potential for a re-
quirement of a third-party audit of that due diligence, has rankled corporations 
in myriad industries.72 Moreover, the provision affects not only companies that 
are required to report to the SEC but also any non-reporting companies that 
find themselves in the supply chain of a reporting company. 
2. Legislative History of Section 1502 
The DRC has a long history of civil war and human rights abuses, and has 
been a source of global concern for decades.73 Moreover, the link between the 
violence and the mineral trade from that region has been documented by a 
number of non-governmental organizations (“NGOs”) and the United Nations, 
and in 2001, the U.N. Security Council (“UNSC”) passed a resolution con-
demning “all illegal exploitation of the natural resources of the [DRC], de-
mand[ing] that such exploitation cease and stress[ing] that the natural resources 
                                                                                                                                
minerals; (2) the country of origin, if known; (3) the efforts to determine the mine or loca-
tion of origin with the greatest possible specificity; (4) the steps the company has taken or 
will take to mitigate the risk that its necessary conflict minerals benefit armed groups, in-
cluding any steps to improve its due diligence process. The company is not required, howev-
er, to obtain an independent private sector audit of its CMR. Id. at 56,344–45. 
72  Cassiterite, or tin, is used by the electronics, automotive, industrial manufacturing, and 
construction industries as a crucial component in solders for joining pipes and circuits; it is 
also used in automobile parts, steel plating, and various alloys. MICHAEL LITTENBERG ET AL., 
CONFLICT MINERALS DUE DILIGENCE 4 (2012), available at http://www.srz.com/files/upload 
/Littenberg_Damania_Valane_PLC_Nov_2011_Conflict_Minerals.pdf. Children’s shoes 
that light up upon impact also contain cassiterite. Id. at 3. Likewise, columbite-tantalite, or 
coltan, is used in hearing aids, pacemakers, carbide tools, and jet engines. Id. at 4. Wolfram-
ite, or tungsten, is used in metal wires, electrodes, and welding instruments. Id. 
73  Originally colonized in 1885 by Belgian King Leopold II, the DRC achieved independ-
ence from Belgium in 1960 but was ruled for the following thirty years by the authoritarian 
regime of Mobutu Sese Seko. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-763, CONFLICT 
MINERALS DISCLOSURE RULE: SEC’S ACTIONS AND STAKEHOLDER-DEVELOPED INITIATIVES 3 
(2012), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592458.pdf. In 1997, Laurent Kabila 
toppled Mobutu’s regime, throwing the country into civil war, during which rebel groups 
took over various regions of the DRC. Id. at 5. Kabila was assassinated in 2001 and power 
shifted to his son, Joseph Kabila, under whose reign the fighting has continued, if not in-
creased. See id. at 5. 
As we reported in 2010, illegal armed groups and some Congolese national military units are 
consistently and directly involved in human rights abuses against the civilian population in east-
ern DRC and are involved in the exploitation of conflict minerals and other trades. We also re-
ported that there is a culture of impunity in eastern DRC in which those who have committed 
human rights abuses do not face justice for the crimes they have committed. After decades of in-
stability and war, the central government in the capital, Kinshasa, currently has little administra-
tive capacity and control over remote regions, including eastern DRC. The long distances be-
tween the capital and eastern DRC and the rudimentary infrastructure, which make 
transportation and communication difficult, further limit the central government’s control in 
eastern DRC. 
Id. 
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of the [DRC] should not be exploited to finance the conflict in that country.”74 
The UNSC also called on member states to “take measures, as they deem ap-
propriate, to ensure that importers, processing industries and consumers of 
Congolese mineral products under their jurisdiction exercise due diligence on 
their suppliers and on the origin of the minerals they purchase.”75 
Likewise, congressional concern with the growing violence the DRC origi-
nated well before 2010 and the passage of Dodd-Frank.76 As early as 2008, var-
iations of legislation akin to Section 1502 had been put forth by members of 
Congress. For instance, in May 2008, Senator Brownback introduced a bill in 
the Senate Finance Committee, which was cosponsored by Senator Durbin, 
called the Conflict Coltan and Cassiterite Act of 2008 (“CCCA”).77 This bill, 
had it become law, would have made it unlawful to import products from the 
DRC that contain coltan or cassiterite.78 The CCCA never received a floor vote, 
and on April 23, 2009, Senator Brownback again introduced legislation, this 
time in the Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee, to address 
the humanitarian crisis in the DRC.79 The contours of Senator Brownback’s 
subsequently proposed bill, called the Congo Conflict Minerals Act of 2009 
(“CCMA”), were much more closely aligned with the Brownback Amendment. 
The CCMA took a noted step back from the more aggressive CCCA in that it 
did not include criminal penalties for willfully violating the CCMA’s other 
provisions.80 Like Section 1502 of Dodd-Frank, the CCMA would have 
                                                        
74  S.C. Res. 1376, para. 8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1376 (Nov. 9, 2001) (emphases omitted). 
75  S.C. Res. 1857, para. 15, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1857 (Dec. 22, 2008). 
76  See 156 CONG. REC. S8680–81 (2010) (statement of Sen. Russ Feingold, addressing the 
rationale behind earlier versions of Section 1502): 
This amendment specifically responds to the continued crisis in the eastern region of the [DRC]. 
Despite efforts to curb the violence, mass atrocities and widespread sexual violence and rape 
continue at an alarming rate. Some have justifiably labeled eastern Congo as “the worst place in 
the world to be female.” Several of us in this body, including Senators Brownback and Durbin 
and I, have traveled to this region and seen first-hand the tragedy of this relentless crisis. 
The concern also extended beyond members of Congress. In the summer of 2009, Secretary 
of State Hillary Clinton visited the DRC to encourage the Congolese government and the 
United Nations to end the violence that is ravaging the country. See Jeffrey Gettleman, Clin-
ton Presses Congo on Illicit Minerals, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2009, at A7. Of particular con-
cern for Secretary Clinton was the increased violence against women, as she declared, 
“Women are being turned into weapons of war.” Id. 
77  Conflict Coltan and Cassiterite Act of 2008, S. 3058, 110th Cong. (2008). 
78  Id. at §§ 3–4. 
79  Congo Conflict Minerals Act of 2009, S. 891, 111th Cong. (2009). Similar legislation was 
proposed in the House of Representatives by Rep. Jim McDermott. See Conflict Minerals 
Trade Act, H.R. 4128, 111th Cong. (2009). 
80  Compare S. 891, with S. 3058. According to Senator Feingold,  
we must tread carefully because there are many communities in eastern Congo whose liveli-
hoods are intertwined with the mining economy. All-out prohibitions or blanket sanctions could 
be counterproductive and negatively affect the very people we seek to help. I am confident that 
[the CCMA] is sensitive to that complex reality. 
155 CONG. REC. S4697 (2009) (statement of Sen. Russ Feingold). 
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amended the Exchange Act by adding certain disclosure requirements, and it 
would have made it U.S. policy to promote peace and security in the DRC.81 
 Of utmost importance for purposes of this Article is the following differ-
ence between the earlier versions of the legislation and the final Section 1502 
language: the final version of Section 1502 deleted a provision that would have 
allowed the SEC to review or temporarily waive the disclosure requirements if 
the SEC determined that a waiver was “(A) necessary for the protection of in-
vestors; and (B) in the public interest.”82 The significance, of course, is that not 
only is the SEC operating well outside of its financial mandate in regulating 
supply-chain disclosures regarding conflict minerals, it was not afforded the 
discretion to attempt to stay true to its investor protection mission in the final 
version of the legislation. 
3. Coloring Outside the Lines: Conflict Mineral Regulation Lies Beyond 
the SEC Mandate 
Section 1502 is not a financial regulation, but rather a provision aimed at 
ending the atrocities of a war occurring seven thousand miles from Wall Street. 
In fact, the prologue of Section 1502 expressly declares: 
It is the sense of Congress that the exploitation and trade of conflict minerals 
originating in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is helping to finance con-
flict characterized by extreme levels of violence in the eastern Democratic Re-
public of the Congo, particularly sexual- and gender-based violence, and con-
tributing to an emergency humanitarian situation therein, warranting the 
                                                        
81  See S. 891 §§ 3, 5. Ultimately, this bill was cosponsored by twenty-two senators in addi-
tion to Senator Brownback. S. 891 (111th): Congo Conflict Minerals Act of 2009: Status, 
GOVTRACK.US, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s111-891 (last visited Nov. 
25, 2014). At the time the CCMA was introduced in committee, Senator Brownback stated, 
“We have taken a strong hard look at [the CCCA] and have done our best to improve on it.” 
155 CONG. REC. S4696 (2009) (statement of Sen. Sam Brownback). Senator Feingold, join-
ing as an original co-sponsor, added that “the long-term goal is not to shut this trade down, 
but to support a conflict-free mining economy that benefits the Congolese people.” Id. at 
S4697 (statement of Sen. Russ Feingold). Other significant differences between the CCMA 
and the final version in Dodd-Frank are that the CCMA would have applied to persons who 
engaged in “the commercial exploration, extraction, importation, exportation, or sale of” 
conflict minerals or use conflict minerals “in the manufacture of a product for sale,” and the 
CCMA would have applied the disclosure requirements not only to parties that engage in the 
relevant activities but also to any person who controls another person or entity (defined as 
controlling 50 percent of the voting stock or capital) that engages in the relevant activities. S. 
891 § 5. Section 1502, by contrast, only applies to issuers that manufacture or contract to 
manufacture products containing conflict minerals. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(p)(1)(A)(ii). Likewise, 
the CCMA did not require an independent audit of the CMR, nor did it require corporate 
disclosure on corporate websites. S. 891 § 5. 
82  Compare Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 111-
203, § 1502(b), 124 Stat. 1376, 2213–15 (2010) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78m), 
with S. 891 § 5. 
15 NEV. L.J. 297 - WOODY.DOCX 3/4/2015  2:55 PM 
318 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 15:297 
provisions of section 13(p) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as added by 
subsection (b).83 
Tasking the SEC with oversight of conflict minerals disclosure is well be-
yond the SEC mandate and overextends the agency in ways that could prove 
harmful to its sole mission: investor protection. In addition, one would be mis-
guided to argue that the task involved in adhering to the legislative intent of 
Section 1502 is one that is well within the SEC’s power. That is, because the 
SEC is charged merely with reviewing additional corporate disclosures, a task 
in which it certainly has expertise, the SEC is in no position to evaluate the ve-
racity of conflict mineral disclosures, nor is it interested in spending resources 
on regulating disclosures of such arguably non-material information.84 
For this reason, the regulation falls into the category of committing maxi-
mum harm to the agency because both the tasks and the goals of the legislative 
provision fall outside of the SEC’s expertise and mandate. This provision re-
quires corporate disclosure of the use of conflict minerals in products, with the 
goal of reducing trade in conflict minerals, and thereby reducing violence in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo. The task of reviewing corporate disclosures to 
assess whether a product contains conflict minerals is of no relevance to the 
SEC as the agency focuses on investor protection. Likewise, the goals of the 
provision fall far afield of the agency’s mission, as well. How does the agency 
show progress on reducing the supply of conflict minerals in the supply chain; 
moreover, how does the agency show progress on reducing violence in the 
eastern region of Congo, as is the stated goal of the statutory provision? Con-
flict minerals regulation represents an example of a statute creating institutional 
harm and increasing an agency’s opportunity cost. 
                                                        
83  Dodd-Frank Act, § 1502(a), 124 Stat. 2213. 
84  See Karen E. Woody, Conflict Minerals Legislation: The SEC’s New Role as Diplomatic 
and Humanitarian Watchdog, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1315, 1339 (2012) (arguing that pres-
ence of conflict minerals in an issuer’s product is immaterial information that need not be 
disclosed); see also Gallagher, supra note 1: 
It is easy to see that the SEC role in this provision is the anomaly. That’s because disclosure 
requirements in the securities laws are about telling investors what they reasonably should want 
to know before investing in a company. The point is to give investors information that is inher-
ently “material” to their investment decisions. Disclosure is, and should be, the primary tool for 
the SEC to use in satisfying its mission. And so it is paramount that we focus on getting timely, 
material disclosures to investors. 
. . . . 
Unfortunately, Section 1502 is about curtailing violence in the DRC; it is not about investor 
protection, promoting fair and efficient markets, or capital formation. Warlords and armed crim-
inals need to fund their nefarious operations. Their funding is their lifeline; it’s a chokepoint that 
should be cut off. That is a perfectly reasonable foreign policy objective. But it’s not an objec-
tive that fits anywhere within the SEC’s threefold statutory mission. 
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C. Extractive Industries Disclosure Requirements 
1. Statutory Requirements 
On August 22, 2012, the SEC issued its final rule implementing Section 
1504 of Dodd-Frank, “Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issu-
ers,” which requires disclosure of payments made to governments for the 
commercial development of oil, natural gas, or minerals.85 
The SEC’s resource extraction rule applies to U.S. and foreign companies 
that are 1) engaged in the commercial development of oil, natural gas, or min-
erals, and 2) required to file annual reports with the SEC. The rule applies to all 
such companies, regardless of their size or the extent of their activities consti-
tuting the commercial development of oil, natural gas, or minerals.86 Under the 
rule, payments related to exploration, extraction, processing, and export, as 
well as the acquisition of a license for such activities, must be disclosed. Thus, 
the rule encompasses not only the types of mining and drilling operations that 
are at the core of the natural resources industry, but also related activities such 
as surveying, refining, processing, and shipping.87 
Issuers that meet these requirements must complete a new form88 and ap-
pend it to their annual reports reflecting all payments (or series of related pay-
ments) of $100,000 or more.89 In addition, the rule applies not only to pay-
ments made by the issuer itself, but also to payments made by a subsidiary of 
the issuer or an entity under the issuer’s control, “based on a consideration of 
all relevant facts and circumstances.”90 
Payments to any foreign government are covered by the rule, as are pay-
ments to the U.S. Federal Government.91 Although payments to U.S. state or 
                                                        
85  Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers, Release No. 34-67717, 77 Fed. 
Reg. 56,365 (Sep. 12, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240 & 249). 
86  Id. at 56,367. 
87  The rule does not, however, cover ancillary or preparatory activities, such as the manufac-
turing of equipment and other products used in the commercial development of oil, natural 
gas, or minerals. Id. at 56,375. 
88  Issuers subject to Section 1504 must attach Form SD to their annual reports. Form SD is 
also the reporting mechanism for information provided under the SEC’s “Conflict Minerals” 
rule, issued under Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act, discussed in Section II.C. The spe-
cific information that must be provided on the form includes: (1) the total amount of pay-
ments, by category; (2) the currency of the payments; (3) the financial period in which the 
payments were made; (4) the business segment of the resource extraction issuer that made 
the payments; (5) the government that received the payments and the relevant country; (6) 
the projects to which the payments relate; (7) the type and total amount of payments for each 
project; and (8) the type and total amount of payments to each government. Id. at 56,368. 
89  This $100,000 threshold reflects the SEC’s interpretation of the Dodd-Frank Act’s re-
quirement that the rule cover payments that are “not de minimis.” Id. 
90  Id. at 56,387. 
91  “Payment” is defined in the rule to include the following: taxes, royalties, fees, produc-
tion entitlements, bonuses, dividends, and payments for infrastructure improvements. Id. at 
 
15 NEV. L.J. 297 - WOODY.DOCX 3/4/2015  2:55 PM 
320 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 15:297 
local governments are exempted, the term “foreign government” also compris-
es state, provincial, municipal, and other subnational governments, as well as 
any company majority-owned by a foreign government.92 Interestingly, the 
SEC rejected a requirement that bribes paid to foreign government officials in 
connection with resource extraction contracts be disclosed. As noted in the fi-
nal rule, “[a]lthough one commentator submitted data regarding payments 
made by some oil companies for tuition, rent, and living expenses for the stu-
dents and relatives of officials in Equatorial Guinea, those payments are not 
within the list of payments [sic] types specified by Section 13(q).”93 However, 
the rule also includes an anti-evasion provision designed to prevent companies 
from concealing or mischaracterizing the true nature of payments that would 
otherwise require disclosure.94 
According to the SEC’s calculations, compliance with the new rule initial-
ly will cost the industry as a whole $1 billion, with additional ongoing costs of 
$200 to $400 million per year.95 The costs of non-compliance, however, can be 
expected to be even more onerous, as alleged violators could face a govern-
ment investigation, penalties, and possible private litigation. Furthermore, 
companies could also face penalties and other repercussions overseas. For in-
stance, on April 9, 2013, the European Union agreed to a preliminary deal re-
quiring oil, gas, mining, and forestry companies to report in greater detail the 
payments they make to foreign governments.96 This disclosure requirement has 
been incorporated in revisions to the EU Accounting Directives97 and the 
Transparency Directive.98  
                                                                                                                                
56,378–79. With the addition of “dividends” and “payments for infrastructure improve-
ments,” this list represents a modest expansion of the types of payments enumerated in the 
statutory language of Dodd-Frank. The SEC declined to adopt a broader, non-exhaustive list 
of payment types, and also omitted a catch-all category for “other material benefits,” as was 
suggested by some commenters on the proposed rule. Id. at 56,379. 
92  Id. at 56,388–89. 
93  Id. at 56,383 n. 257 (emphasis added). This comment originated in a letter submitted by 
Senator Carl Levin. Letter from Carl Levin, Chairman, U.S. Senate Permanent Subcomm. on 
Investigations, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, SEC, (Feb. 1, 2011), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-42-10/s74210-19.pdf. 
94  77 Fed. Reg. at 56,380. 
95  Id. at 56,398. 
96  See Statement by Comm’r Michel Barnier Welcoming the Agreement Reached on Disclo-
sure Requirements for the Extractive Industry and Loggers of Primary Forests and on Sim-
pler Accounting Requirements for Small Companies (Apr. 9, 2013) available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-323_en.pdf. 
97  See Council Directive 2013/34, 2013 O.J. (L 182) 52 (EU). 
98  Council Directive 2013/50, 2013 O.J. (L 294) 20 (EU). The new legislation, which must 
be formally adopted by member states and the European Parliament, is a result of negotia-
tions between the European Commission and the European Parliament regarding a European 
Commission legislative proposal adopted on October 25, 2011. 
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The EU legislation follows guidelines developed by the Extractive Industry 
Transparency Initiative (“EITI”)99 and would require all extractive and forestry 
industry companies listed on EU exchanges to report payments made to gov-
ernments and local authorities in each country and for each project.100 The pro-
posed EU law, however, goes one step further than the U.S. law by subjecting 
large unlisted companies registered in the European Union to reporting re-
quirements, even if they are not listed on an exchange or subject to other re-
porting requirements.101 The SEC rule, in contrast, only applies to U.S. issuers 
and foreign private issuers with pre-existing reporting requirements to the 
Commission. The proposed EU law also is broader than the U.S. law because it 
includes the forestry industry among the categories of companies covered by 
the new reporting requirements. As a result of the SEC rule and the preliminary 
EU legislation, nearly 90 percent of all major extractive industry companies 
will be required to disclose their payments to governments and local authori-
ties.102 
One area in which the U.S. law is more stringent than the EU law, howev-
er, relates to exemptions from the disclosure requirement.103 The EU legislation 
                                                        
99  EITI is a standard-setting body comprised of companies, governments, and non-
governmental organizations aimed at creating transparency in the oil, gas, and mining indus-
tries. What is the EITI?, EITI, http://eiti.org/eiti (last visited Nov. 24, 2014). 
100  “Extractive industry” as defined in the EU legislation includes all companies with activi-
ties involving the exploration, discovery, development, and extraction of minerals, oil, and 
natural gas deposits, while the forestry industry includes companies with activities involving 
the clear-cutting, selective logging, or thinning of primary forests. ERNST & YOUNG, 
DISCLOSING GOVERNMENT PAYMENTS: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY 3 
(2013). Like companies subject to Section 1504, EU companies will need to report taxes, 
royalties, signature bonuses, licenses, concessions, leases and any other payments made to 
government and local authorities in the countries where the companies operate. “Other pay-
ments” subject to reporting requirements may include rental fees, transit fees, and dividends. 
Id. This level of disclosure is required for each project the company has undertaken in each 
country. The threshold for the disclosure of payments related to each project is set at 
€100,000 (approximately $130,000). Id. at 4. 
101  The EU’s Accounting Directives defines a large company as that which exceeds two of 
the three following criteria: (a) revenue of €40 million; (b) total assets of €20 million; and 
(c) 250 employees. Council Directive 2013/34, at 28. 
102  Although not discussed in this Article, the disclosure requirement in the extractive indus-
tries may signal increasing disclosure requirements for other global industries, including tel-
ecommunications and construction. Indeed, the EU ministers agreed on a provision in the 
proposed EU law that requires them to decide in 2015 whether to extend the disclosure re-
quirements to other sectors. ERNST & YOUNG, supra note 100. I hope to address this in future 
scholarship. 
103  During the rulemaking process for Section 1504, a number of exemptions to the rule 
were considered but ultimately rejected. For example, there is no exemption for issuers that 
are subject to similar reporting requirements under home country laws or other mandates. 
Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers, Release No. 34-67717, 77 Fed. Reg. 
56,365, 56,368 (Sep. 12, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240 & 249). Conversely, the 
rule does not provide an exemption for instances in which a foreign law prohibits a required 
disclosure. Accordingly, issuers cannot use the law of a resource-producing state as a shield 
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provides that companies may exclude payments to a government where disclo-
sure is clearly prohibited by criminal legislation of that country. In such a case, 
the company must report that it is not reporting payments in a specified coun-
try. Conversely, the SEC rule does not allow an exemption based on the prohi-
bition of disclosure in a foreign jurisdiction.104 In addition, the EU law provides 
an exemption in situations where obtaining the data required for disclosure is 
overly burdensome; the SEC rule provides no such exemption. However, in Ju-
ly 2013, the District Court for the District of Columbia remanded the SEC rule 
back to the SEC, holding that the SEC did not provide ample justification for 
why the mandated disclosures had to be public rather than private. In addition, 
the district court held that the SEC misinterpreted that congressional mandate 
when the agency did not provide an exemption for disclosing payments made 
in countries that prohibit disclosure of payment information.105 
2. Legislative History of Section 1504 
Section 1504 of Dodd-Frank was designed to improve transparency and 
empower citizens of resource-rich countries to hold their governments account-
able for the management of revenues derived from natural resources. The orig-
inal bill that eventually became Section 1504 was the Energy Security Through 
Transparency Act of 2009 (“ESTTA”), proposed by Senator Lugar on Septem-
ber 23, 2009.106 
On the same day, the ESTTA was referred to the Senate Committee on 
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, from which it never emerged. Eight 
months later, and three days before the Senate passed its version of Dodd-
Frank, Senator Cardin, a co-sponsor of the ESTTA, included an amendment 
that would become Section 1504 (the Cardin-Lugar Amendment), the operative 
language of which closely tracked that of the ESTTA.107 The Cardin-Lugar 
Amendment was tabled on the Senate floor and was not included in the version 
of the Act passed by the Senate. Senators Cardin and Lugar persisted, however, 
                                                                                                                                
against disclosure to the U.S. government. Rather, the SEC has in effect mandated that issu-
ers disregard such foreign laws. Finally, the SEC’s rule does not provide an exemption for 
confidentiality provisions in existing or future contracts that would otherwise prevent disclo-
sure of commercially sensitive information. Id. 
104  This exemption likely will be put in place after the July 2013 ruling remanding the SEC 
Dodd-Frank rule back to the SEC for additional rulemaking. See infra note 105 and accom-
panying text. 
105  See, e.g., Katy O’Donnell, Judge Vacates SEC Dodd-Frank Rule for Extractive Indus-
tries, Remands to SEC, MAIN JUSTICE (July 2, 2013, 10:58 AM), http://www.mainjustice 
.com/justanticorruption/2013/07/02/judge-vacates-sec-dodd-frank-rule-for-extractive-
industries-remands-to-sec/. 
106  Energy Security Through Transparency Act of 2009, S. 1700, 111th Cong. (2009). 
107  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 111-203, § 1502, 
124 Stat. 1376, 2213–18 (2010) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78m) (Passed in the 
Senate on May 20, 2010, amending H.R. 4173). 
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and were finally successful in having their amendment included in the version 
of Dodd-Frank that emerged from the joint conference committee and eventual-
ly became law. 
What seems to have been the primary driver for ESTTA is a desire to assist 
citizens in resource-rich countries around the world in combatting government 
corruption.108 The text of ESTTA states that the reasons behind the bill includ-
ed strengthening national security and foreign policy, increasing energy securi-
ty, promoting reliability of commodity supplies, and creating a better business 
climate for oil, gas, and mining companies.109 For example, in addition to the 
Congressional finding that transparency in revenue payments to governments 
enables citizens to hold their leaders more accountable, other Congressional 
findings supporting the bill included: 
Developing countries that derive a significant portion of revenues from natu-
ral resource extraction tend to have higher poverty rates, weaker governance, 
higher rates of conflict, and poorer development records than countries that do 
not rely on resource revenues. The consequences of what is known as the “re-
source curse” including the erosion of civil society, a rise in internal conflicts 
and regional violence, and the proliferation of terrorism are likely to pose a 
long-term threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economic interests 
of the United States.110 
                                                        
108  The text of ESTTA also states its congressional findings: 
It is the sense of Congress that— 
(1) the President should work with foreign governments, including members of the Group of 
8 and the Group of 20, to establish domestic requirements that companies under the jurisdiction 
of each government publicly disclose any payments made to a government relating to the com-
mercial development of oil, natural gas, and minerals; and  
(2) the United States Government should commit to global leadership of transparency in ex-
tractive industries by supporting— 
(A) multilateral pro-transparency efforts, such as the Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative, in revenue collection, budgeting, expenditure, and wealth management; 
(B) bilateral efforts to promote good governance in the extractive industries through 
United States missions and activities abroad; 
(C) the implementation of extractive industries reporting requirements for companies un-
der the jurisdiction of the United States similar to the requirements established under section 
6 of this Act; and 
(D) efforts to persuade other members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation to adopt uniform legislation to 
ensure a coordinated regulatory approach. 
S. 1700 at §3. 
109  Id. at §2. (“The Congress finds the following: (1) It is in the interest of the United States 
to promote good governance in the extractive industries sector because good governance 
strengthens the national security and foreign policy of the United States, contributes to a bet-
ter investment climate for businesses in the United States, increases the reliability of com-
modity supplies upon which businesses and people in the United States rely, and promotes 
greater energy security.”). 
110  Id. 
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Two Congressional findings supporting the bill, however, addressed the 
nexus between transparency in the extractive industries and investor protection. 
These findings noted that: (1) transparency in revenue payments is “good for 
business, since it improves the business climate in which [extractive industry 
corporations] work and fosters good governance and accountability” and (2) 
transparency in revenue payments benefits shareholders because “such share-
holders have a desire to know the amount of such payments in order to assess 
financial risk, compare payments from country to country, and assess whether 
such payments help to create a more stable investment climate,” whereas un-
disclosed payments may be perceived as corrupt and as decreasing the value of 
the corporation.111 
3. No Harm, No Foul? 
Like the FCPA, this disclosure requirement aimed at stemming global cor-
ruption seems to stretch the resources of the SEC for goals not within its man-
date. As noted above, the stated goals of the provision, as evidenced by the leg-
islative history, are to improve transparency and empower citizens of resource-
rich countries to hold their governments accountable for the management of 
revenues derived from natural resources. The task required by the legislation, 
reviewing corporate accounting and payments, is well within the SEC’s exper-
tise and indeed is a critical element of the agency’s standard portfolio of duties. 
Because Section 1504 at its core requires additional transparency in corporate 
accounting, the task of regulating this provision is distinct from its goals. The 
task, therefore, is one in which the SEC has both an interest and expertise. In 
other words, despite the goal of this provision being outside the purview of the 
SEC’s typical sphere, the practical enforcement requirement is one that dove-
tails with the agency’s existing mandate of investor protection and fraud pre-
vention. However, because the stated goal of the legislation is the empower-
ment of citizens of foreign countries, how is the SEC to show progress in 
effectuating the goal of the provision? It is difficult, therefore, to assess and 
measure the effectiveness and efficiency of the agency’s work when the goals 
are unrelated to the core mission of the agency. Moreover, in an agency already 
stretched thin, the tasks related to this provision, although well within the agen-
cy’s competency, may fall in the list of priorities when juxtaposed with agency 
tasks for goals that fall within the agency’s mandate. 
In actuality, the extractive industry disclosure provision is very similar to 
the accounting provisions of the FCPA and, as detailed above, enforcement of 
transparent accounting is appropriately housed with the SEC. Nonetheless, de-
spite the practicalities of this provision rendering this a much “closer call” on 
misappropriation of the agency, the clear stated goals of the provision reside in 
the political and diplomatic sphere, and may well be better achieved with over-
                                                        
111  Id. 
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lapping jurisdiction. As described in Part I, however, this provision exemplifies 
a situation wherein the agency may be well-equipped to handle the tasks, but 
the goals of the provision are elusive. Thus, the effectiveness of the agency’s 
work is nearly impossible to calculate and assess. 
The extractive mineral statute therefore causes less institutional “harm” be-
cause the tasks involved line up with the agency’s tasks for other regulations 
falling within its mandate. In other words, because the task involved in the reg-
ulation of Section 1504 lines up with typical agency tasks, such as review and 
analysis of corporate books and records, there is less institutional harm done. 
However, one cannot overlook the fact that the goals of Section 1504 are strict-
ly extraterritorial, and the regulatory tasks of the agency therefore will be used 
as foreign policy measures. 
CONCLUSION 
 The goal of this article has been to consider the role and mission of the se-
curities laws and its regulatory agency, the SEC, as Congress continues to en-
list the agency as a player in the foreign policy arena. Of the three examples 
discussed in Part II, each represents a different degree of congressional misap-
propriation. First, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act represents a failure of 
Congress to streamline the SEC and its resources by declining to consolidate 
enforcement of the anti-bribery provisions with the DOJ. Second, conflict min-
erals legislation represents over-reaching by Congress and inappropriate use of 
the SEC for purposes clearly outside of the SEC mandate, namely, violence re-
duction in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Finally, the extractive industries 
disclosure requirement in Dodd-Frank represents a legislative measure aimed at 
exacting an extraterritorial and diplomatic goal through the use of securities 
laws. However, because this provision calls for greater transparency in corpo-
rate accounting to achieve its goal, the use of the SEC as the enforcing agency 
is not without merit. Nonetheless, the stated goal of the extractive industries 
disclosure is not in line with the SEC mandate, even if the task for achieving 
the goal dovetails with SEC expertise. 
While the tasks inherent in the statutory provisions examined may fall in 
line with the SEC’s typical regulatory tasks, measuring success and accounta-
bility in light of the statutory goals is outside of the agency’s capability and in-
terest. The result is an overburdened agency, at risk of failing to execute the 
tasks at the core of its mission of investor protection. 
